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LITIGATING JURY ISSUES IN CAPITAL TRIALS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
VIRGINIA PROCEDURES
BY: PAULA DYAN EFFLE
I. Introduction
A capital defendant has a fundamental right to be tried by a jury
drawn from a representative cross section of the community and which
has been subjected to a thorough voir dire to remove those jurors with
conscious and unconscious biases against the defendant, including jurors
who cannot fairly consider a penalty less than death. Unfortunately, jury
selection is perceived as an area requiring a great investment of time and
money to be successful. As a result, challenges to the selection of jurors
and jury venires are often ignored or handled perfunctorily before trial.
Often the best a trial record offers on jury selection is a cursory Batson
challenge that must be used in an attempt to circumvent procedural
default when the other jury selection issues are finally raised on appeal
and habeas corpus.
This article summarizes the constitutional rights of a capital defen-
dant and discusses tactics available to defense counsel pre-trial to make
effective jury claims. Jury selection issues are important for several
reasons. Raising jury issues provides a pressure point in negotiating a
noncapital plea with the Commonwealth. Additionally, recognizing and
avoiding procedural default hurdles at trial provides appellate counsel
with a solid record for getting the issues heard later. Finally, a well-
planned attack on the jury venire and voir dire may help expose the
fundamental flaws in Virginia's jury selection process and win the client
a new trial in the process.
II. Challenges to the Venire
The Supreme Court of the United States has specifically held that
the composition of ajury venire is subject to challenge based on both the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the "fair
cross-section" requirement implicit in the Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury. Because each claim protects distinct rights, each requires
a different showing to state a prima facie case. Strategically, defense
counsel should make separate pre-trial motions for each claim and obtain
separate rulings from the trial court judge on each issue.1
A. Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirements
The Sixth Amendmentguarantees atrialby an"impartialjury of the
state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."'2 The
requirement is grounded fundamentally in a societal interest in the
integrity of the criminal trial and public confidence in the criminal justice
system. A Sixth Amendment challenge is an especially powerful tool for
the capital defendant, as it requires no showing of prejudice in order for
1 This is particularly important because Virginia courts have a
tendency to confuse the two claims, and have incorrectly denied a faircross-
section claim on the basis that no discriminatory intent has been shown.
See, e.g., Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341,385 S.E.2d 50 (1989);
Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307,362 S.E.2d 650 (1987).
2 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
3 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
4 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
5 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363 (1979).
6 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975).
7 Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
8 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419
(1994)(women); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1968)(women);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (African-Americans) (pre-incorpo-
the defendant to be entitled to relief. The fair cross-section requirement
is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
3
The fair cross-section requirement is defined as an array from which
no cognizable group has been systematically excluded. 4 Although the
defendant is not entitled to proportional representation of the community
in the jury array, he is entitled to a fair opportunity for such proportion-
ality.5 Moreover, a criminal defendant has standing to challenge exclu-
sion resulting in a violation of the fair cross-section requirement, whether
or not he is a member of the excluded class.
6
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-
section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the
group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires
from which juries is selected is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury selection process.
7
Precisely what constitutes a "cognizable" group has not been
articulated by the Supreme Court, but it is relatively settled that groups
defined by race, ethnicity, and gender are cognizable.8 Additionally,
groups defined by economic, social, religious, political and geographical
criteria may be "cognizable" for purposes of making a claim under the
fair cross-section requirement. 9
To make a showing of substantial underrepresentation, courts have
used two statistical methods. "Absolute disparity" measures the differ-
ence between the percentage of the group in the jury pool and the
percentage of the community that the group represents. An absolute
disparity of over ten percent has been considered significant.1 0 "Com-
parative disparity", more useful with small groups, denotes the percent-
age of the cognizable group represented in the array divided by the
percentage of the community the group represents. The resulting figure
indicates what percentage of the group has been summoned.
An example illustrates the two concepts. Suppose a pool in which
thirty percent of those called for jury service or selected for a particular
case were women, drawn from a community in which fifty percent of
those lawfully and constitutionally eligible for service were women. The
absolute disparity in this pool is twenty percent; the comparative dispar-
ity is sixty percent (only three-fifths of the women required to make the
pool representative have been summoned). The Supreme Court has
recognized a comparative disparity of thirty-eight percent as signifi-
cant.1t
ration); UnitedStates v. Test, 550 F.2d 577,586 (10th Cir. 1976)(Hispan-
ics).
9 See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217,220 (1946). The
case involved an action against a railroad company and defined the
excluded group as wage earners. The Court stated that "[riecognition
must be given to the fact that those eligible forjury service are to be found
in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than
a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system.
To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discrimina-
tions which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury." Id.
t0 United States v. Tuttle, 729 F.2d 1325, 1327 (11 th Cir. 1984).
11 Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). The case was decided
under equal protection analysis, but this statistical measurement of
underrepresentation is a common feature of both types of claims.
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Once the defense attorney makes these two showings, the court is
required to infer that the underrepresentation results from the selection
process. Again, unlike an equal protection claim, no showing ofdiscrimi-
natory intent is required, and the prima facie case cannot be rebutted
simply by asserting a lack of intent. Only proof of a significant govern-
mental interest which justifies the imbalance may defeat a Sixth Amend-
ment claim to the jury array.
12
B. Equal protection challenges to the venire
Five elements are required to make out a prima facie case in an equal
protection challenge. First, the defendant must have standing. Even if the
defendant is not a member of an excluded group, he or she has standing as
a representative of the excluded juror.13 Once standing has been estab-
lished, the following must be established: 1) the group is a recognizably
distinctclass; 2) thegroup has been singled outfor differenttreatmentunder
the law, as written or applied; 3) substantial underrepresentation of the
group has occurred over a significant period of time; and 4) the selection
procedure itself is susceptible to abuse or is not neutral.
14
Equal protection guarantees involve a juror's personal interest in
not being subjected to irrational and discriminatory classifications, as
well as a societal interest in the integrity of the system. 15 Two key aspects
distinguish equal protection claims from fair cross-section claims. First,
equal protection analysis traditionally applies only to race, ethnicity, and
gender (so-called "suspect classifications") and it may be difficult to
convince a court to be receptive to Equal Protection Clause claims based
on categories other than these two narrow classes. Second, a prima facie
equal protection challenge may be rebutted by a showing that discrimi-
natory intent is absent. 16
C. Virginia procedures
The creation of the venire from which grand and petit jurors are
selected in Virginia is governed by Virginia Code section 8.01-345. Prior
to October first of each year, Virginia circuit court judges appoint jury
commissioners for the following year. Prior to December first, the jury
commissioners submit to the clerks of Virginia courts a list of qualified
inhabitants of their respective cities orcounties. In generating this list, the
Code states that:
The jury commissioners shall utilize random selection tech-
niques, either manual, mechanical, or electronic, using a
current voter registration list and, where feasible, a list of
persons issued a driver's license [] from the Department of
12 Duren, 439 U.S. at 368. If the state suggests that permissible
exemptions from jury service are responsible for the statistical disparity,
evidence must be produced. "[M]ere suggestions or assertions to that
effect are insufficient." Id. at 369. Reasonable exemptions, such as those
based on special hardship, incapacity, or community needs, are permis-
sible. However, if an exemption results in underrepresentation of a
particular group, a serious question as to the "reasonableness" of the
exemption arises. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 534.
13 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
14 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494 (1977).
15 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
16 However, large disparities over a significant period of time have
been held not rebutted by mere assertions of absence of intent. See, e.g.,
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 551 (1967); Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972).
17 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-345 (Michie 1992) (emphasis added).
18 Id. "[T]he statutory provisions with respect to empanelingjuries
are mandatory and not directory." Harmon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va.
442,444, 185 S.E.2d 48,50 (1971) (citing Slaterv. Commonwealth, 182
Motor Vehicles, city or county directories, telephone books,
personal property tax rolls, and other such lists as may
be designated and approved by the chief judge of the cir-
cuit .... 17
After the random selection, the commissioners apply statutory
exceptions and exemptions. The Chief Judge is required to "ensure the
integrity of the random selection process" and to ensure compliance with
the provisions of the law governing jury selection.
18
1. Virginia procedures violate fair cross-section require-
ments and are facially unconstitutional.
Many jurisdictions in the Commonwealth draw potential jurors
from only voter registration lists, contrary to the clear mandate of the
statute. In those jurisdictions, a facial claim of a fair cross-section
violation is possible.19 The 1990 National Census figures indicate that
the number of voting age Virginia residents is approximately 4.7 million.
Of that number, approximately 3.7 million (79%) are white, 823,000
(17.5%) are African-American and 166,000 (3.5%) are other non-white
minorities. 20 By comparison, only about 3 million Virginia residents are
currently registered to vote. Therefore, 1.7 million people who have the
right to an opportunity to sit on a trial jury or a grand jury are excluded
from consideration.
Arguably, these 1.7 million people represent a "cognizable" group
for purposes of making a fair cross-section claim under the Sixth
Amendment. 2 1 In evaluating Virginia's jury selection procedures, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized that,
[t]here is a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a group
which represents a cross-section of the community. And a
cross-section of the community includes persons with varying
degrees of training and intelligence and with varying eco-
nomic and social positions.... It is a democratic institution,
representative of all qualified classes of people.
22
Not only is the group cognizable - all nonregistered but eligible
voters - but the statistical disparity, both absolute and comparative, is
a highly significant one hundred percent. Another fair cross-section
argument arises if the percentage of non-white minorities that are
registered voters is not the same as the percentage of minorities that are
of voting, and thereforejury-eligible, age. In that case, the masterlist will
not represent a cross-section of the community with respect to racial
composition.23 Over time, Virginia's recent and reluctant enactment of
the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (the "motor voter bill')
Va. 579, 582,29 S.E.2d 853, 854 (1944); Jones v. Commonwealth, 100
Va. 842, 846, 41 S.E. 951, 952 (1902); Hall v. Commonwealth, 80 Va.
555,561 (1885)).
19 These arguments were originally presented by Marvin D. Miller,
Esq., from Alexandria, Virginia at the April 14, 1995 Continuing Legal
Education Seminar hosted by Washington and Lee University School of
Law and the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse.
20 Additionally, the National Census provides population informa-
tion regarding gender, household income, marital status and age.
21 See Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 820 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting
that "[c]ognizability derives meaning from the nature of the injury
alleged, i.e., thatbecause of discrimination in selection procedures,juries
are not being drawn from a fair cross section of the community").
22 Witcher v. Peyton, 405 F.2d 725,727 (4th Cir. 1969) (quoting
Fay v.New York, 332 U.S. 261,299-300 (1947) (Murphy, J. dissenting));
see note 6, supra.
23 Note that the same holds true of differences in percentages of
women, men, ethnic minorities, religious minorities, etc.
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might possibly bring the non-white numbers more in line with the census
numbers. In the meantime, however, debate on the bill itself provides
evidence that the voter registration system has historically suffered from
racial bias.24
2. Application of Virginia jury selection statutes violates
both fair cross-section and equal protection guarantees.
The Virginia State Board of Elections, which is responsible for all
voting and voting registration regulation, does not keep records of
statistical information similar to that available from the National Census.
In those circuits that include driver's license lists, the Department of
Motor Vehicles also does not keep statistical information on the race or
gender composition of the lists. Therefore, in order to make a prima facie
case of underrepresentation in violation of the Sixth Amendment or the
Equal Protection Clause, defense counsel will need to obtain the statis-
tical breakdown of the actual jury list in the particular jurisdiction.
There are several tools available to obtain this information. First,
defense counsel should file a discovery motion specifically seeking a
statistical breakdown of the master jury list, in terms of all cognizable
groups, delineating that the breakdown is to include race, sex, age,
economic factors and any other relevant classification. If this motion is
denied on the basis that the required information does not exist, counsel
may file a motion asking leave to perform such a survey as is necessary
to determine whether a cognizable group has been systematically ex-
cluded from the master list.25
In order to reduce the burden on defense counsel, an Ake-type
motion for appointment of an expert in the area or funds to hire such an
expert, based on the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments is also
in order.26 The Supreme Court, in recognizing the imbalance between
the resources available to a State and an indigent defendant, found that
the Constitution requires appointment and payment for the "basic tools
of an adequate defense."27 The rationale of the Court's decision in Ake
applies to all experts reasonably necessary for an effective defense.
Additionally, it can be argued that the Sixth Amendment's entitlement to
the effective assistance of counsel includes "the allowance of investiga-
tive expenses or appointment of investigative assistance for indigent
defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by
their attorneys." 28
If the trial court denies these motions, they should be renewed when
the panel for the individual case is called because the fair cross-section
and equal protection guarantees apply to the panel as well as the array.
Like all constitutional issues, to avoid procedural default the claims must
24 See Jeff E. Shapiro, Allen Gets Voting Measure, Richmond
Times Dispatch, Feb. 16,1996 at A-10. Sen. Yvonne B. Miller is quoted
as stating that defeated amendments to the bill were a "'smoke screen
that's an attempt to repeat [Virginia's] inglorious history' of racially
biased voting laws." Id.
25 Although the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that the jury list
is to be kept secret unless good cause is shown, Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va.
633,194 S.E.2d 707 (1973), this case appears to have been overruled by
statute. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-351 (Michie'1992) provides that"[t]he list
shall be available in the clerk's office for inspection by counsel in any
case to be tried by a jury during the term."
26 See Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse Trial Manual for an
article from The Champion regarding the preparation of a jury composi-
tion challenge.
27 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
28 Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975).
29 See Townes, Maximizing Your Potential: The Effective Use of
Co-Counsel in a Capital Case, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
be based on the federal constitution, and it is imperative that the motions
state this expressly and firmly. Again to avoid default, defense counsel
should renew their objection when the jury is empaneled and move for
a new venire.
III. Voir Dire
As with challenges to the array, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments provide specific protections during voir dire.
A. Sixth Amendment impartiality requirement
In every capital case, defense counsel should seek to obtain indi-
vidual and sequestered voir dire. The Virginia Capital Case Clearing-
house Trial Manual provides a sample motion and supporting memoran-
dum to achieve this. The voir dire of capital jurors underscores the need
for an effective co-counsel to ferret out biased jurors without jeopardiz-
ing credibility before the jury that is finally empaneled.
29
Basic Sixth Amendmentprotection requires that "[e]very prospective
juror must stand indifferent to the cause, 'and any reasonable doubt as to a
juror's qualifications must be resolved in favor of the accused.' 30 Appel-
late courts, especially the Virginia Supreme Court, are extremely deferen-
tial to the trial court judge when examining this issue.31 Therefore, it is
imperative that defense counsel impress upon thejudge the importance that
the juror can follow the reasonable doubt standard. For example, a juror
who indicates a belief that the defendant is required to prove his innocence,
or to testify, cannot be rehabilitated by giving "expected answers to leading
questions" 32 by a trial court judge or opposing counsel. "Mere assent to a
trial judge's questions or statements, or to counsel's leading inquiry, is not
enough to rehabilitate a prospective juror who has initially demonstrated a
prejudice or partial predisposition."
33
Moreover, capital defendants have the right to an impartial sentenc-
ing jury.34 Virginia Rule 3A:14 was amended to make it clear that
counsel, as well as the judge, has the right to examine prospective
jurors.35 Because ajuror is to be excluded if his or her attitude toward the
death penalty would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath,"
'36
it follows that counsel are entitled to examine prospective jurors about
every matter that could prevent or substantially impair performance as
required by law.37 A section of the Clearinghouse's trial manual entitled
"The Right to Meaningful Voir Dire" provides a thorough discussion of
the areas defense counsel should explore, and suggests methods by
which scrupled jurors can be rehabilitated.
30 Clements v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 386, 392,464 S.E.2d
534,537 (1995) (quotingBreeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297,298,
227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976)).
31 See Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460,475,450 S.E.2d 379,
389 (1994), and case summary of Weeks, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.7,
No.2, p. 12 (1995).
32 McGillv. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 237,242,391 S.E.2d 597,
600 (1990) (citing cases).
33 Griffin v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 619,625,454 S.E.2d 363,
366 (1995) (citingFoley v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 149, 159-60,379
S.E.2d 915, 921, aff d en banc, 9 Va. App. 175,384 S.E.2d 813 (1989)).
34 Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 283 S.E.2d 212
(1981).
35 See also Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-358 (Michie 1992).
36 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
37 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (holding that voir
dire on a juror's inability to consider a life sentence is constitutionally
required).
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B. Batson challenges
In Batson v. Kentucky38, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor
may not utilize peremptory strikes to exclude African-Americans from
the jury solely on account of their race or on the assumption that African-
American jurors will be unable to consider impartially the state's case
against an African-American defendant. The Court found that the use of
peremptory challenges to discriminate against racial minorities violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The same
prohibition applies to the peremptory strikes of defense counsel. 39 As
with the fair cross-section requirement, the individual making theBatson
challenge need not be the same race as the struck juror.4 0
1. The prima facie case
Although Batson challenges were originally limited to cognizable
racial groups, the Supreme Court has also held that women and ethnic
groups are within Batson's reach.4 1 Lower courts have extended the
protection to additional classifications, utilizing a rationale similar to that
found in the fair cross-section cases, including the suggestion by some
courts that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the exercise of peremp-
tory strikes to remove individuals of a particular socioeconomic class.42
To make out a prima facie Batson challenge, the defendant must
show that the prosecutorhas used peremptory strikes to remove individu-
als of a protected group. The defendant must also establish that the facts
and circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used the pe-
remptory strike process to remove venire members from the petit jury on
account of their race.43 Several kinds of evidence are useful in making
the inference that jurors have been struck for discriminatory reasons.
First, the defendant is entitled to "rely on the fact.., that peremptory
challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' 44 Second, if the only
common characteristic of all struck jurors is their race, or if the prosecu-
tor uses a peremptory strike to remove the only member of a particular
race from the venire, a discriminatory inference may arise.45 Third, the
nature of the struck juror's voir dire responses or the nature of the voir
dire questioning by the prosecutor may also prove useful.46 Finally, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the race of the victim, the
defendant and witnesses is a consideration. 47
38 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
39 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,59 (1992).
40 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
41 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994)
(male defendant can challenge peremptory strikes of male jurors);
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (Hispanics).
42 See, e.g., United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (women); UnitedStates v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.
1992) (peremptory strike based on fact that juror lived in a poor, violent
area was not race-neutral); United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Hispanics); United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 994 (1989) (Jews recognized as a cogni-
zable group for purposes of civil rights statute); United States v. Biaggi,
853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989) (Italians);
Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1052 (1989) (whites); UnitedStates v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir.
1987) (Native Americans); People v. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d 711 (1986), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 1702 (1995) (in dictum, the court suggests that
2. Attacking the prosecutor's "race-neutral" explanation
Although a prosecutor's explanation "need not rise to the level of
justifying a challenge for cause," 48 thejustification must identify "legiti-
mate reasons" that are "related to the particular case to be tried"49 and
sufficiently persuasive to rebut the prima facie case. Unpersuasive or
even implausible explanations may be legitimate; the threshold inquiry
is whether the explanation was facially valid and not discriminatory.
50
However, the trial court's ultimate decision as to whether the strike was
legitimate will hinge on how well the explanation is logically related to
the particular case. Therefore, defense counsel should press the prosecu-
tor and point out to the court that the explanation is not supported by the
record.
One author has articulated a number of examples indicating a
discriminatory strike.51 If the reasons are a "sham or thinly disguised
pretext for purposeful racial discrimination", if the explanation was too
vague, or if the "prosecutor engaged in no questions on voir dire that
would indicate a good-faith interest in the jurors' attitudes that he now
claims justified the peremptory challenge", the prosecutor has failed to
rebut the prima facie Batson challenge. 52 Another category of illegiti-
mate strikes involves the excluded juror as compared to those Who were
not struck. Defense counsel should always make sure the trial court is
aware that other jurors with the same characteristics or voir dire re-
sponses as a stricken juror remain seated. For example, if a black juror
is stricken because she is young and childless and other young childless
jurors remain seated, the prosecutor's explanation is suspect.
A final type of unacceptable justification is one that indicates a
secondary form of discrimination. In the previous example, the juror's
youth may be an illegitimate reason on its face for the strike, unless the
prosecutor can explain logically how the juror's age is relevant to the
specific case. Similar arguments can be made when a strike is based on
a juror's religion, gender, or socioeconomic status.
53
IV. Defense Strategies - Avoiding Procedural Default
Before voir dire, defense counsel should decide what he or she
hopes to accomplish by challenging the jury selection process. If the
exclusion of "working class" people violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
43 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1985).
44 Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
45 See United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741,747 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988); United States v. Chalen, 812 F.2d
1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
46 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; see, e.g., People v. Allen, 23 Cal, 3d 286
(1979) (noting that black juror peremptorily struck by prosecutor had
friends or relatives in law enforcement).
47 United States v. Grandison, 885 F.2d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 934 (1990).
48 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
49 Id. at 98 n.20.
50 Purkett v. Elem, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995).
51 Peter Schoenburg, A Lawyer's Perspective on Jury Selection
After Batson, Jury Selection, (2d ed. Supp. 1995) at 16-17.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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atmosphere suggests that the goal of achieving a more representative jury
at trial is realistic, defense counsel should consider bringing up jury
issues early by filing motions to discover the racial composition of the
jury array and to ensure that racial, ethnic and gender divisions are on the
record. Counsel should also make sure that basic facts about the racial,
ethnic, and gender identities of the defendant, victim, and witnesses are
on the record. This puts the trial court and the prosecution on notice early
that defense counsel intends to work zealously to achieve a representa-
tive petit jury.
In some situations, the best that defense counsel can hope to do with
a jury challenge is to preserve a strong record to achieve reversal on
appeal. In these cases, building a strong record is paramount. To do so,
defense counsel must establish the group affiliation of each individual
juror, the defendant, victim, and witnesses on the record. Additionally,
a motion to have the prosecution's notes and materials used in the jury
selection process sealed and preserved as a part of the appellate record is
recommended.
MAXIMIZING YOUR POTENTIAL: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF
CO-COUNSEL IN A CAPITAL CASE
BY: COURTNEY S. TOWNES
As any attorney who has defended a capital case well knows,
defending a capital case is different. The severe and irrevocable nature
of the death penalty places a heavy responsibility upon defense counsel.
Effective representation of a client facing the death penalty requires
hundreds of hours of fact investigation and legal research as well as
limitless energy and staying power. In recognition of the extraordinary
demands inherent in capital cases, the American Bar Association recom-
mends that state courts assign two attorneys who are qualified for capital
litigation to each individual case. 1 On the federal level, statutory law
entitles a capital defendant to dual representation upon the defendant's
request.2 Although Virginia does not by statute require more than one
attorney in a capital case, courts have appointed two attorneys to capital
defendants as a matter of course. 3
I. Investigation and Division of Labor
A capital case contains two trials, one deciding guilt and one
deciding punishment. It is extremely important that the defense devote
commensurate time and energy to both the guilt-innocence phase and the
penalty trial. Striking the balance, however, is not easy, because defense
performance in the guilt phase revolves around theories of innocence,
defense counsel is thus inevitably less inclined to prepare for the penalty
phase which follows swiftly if there is a guilty verdict. A persistent
danger exists, therefore, that, notwithstanding competent counsel, pen-
alty phase preparation will be lost in the shadows while preparing for the
guilt-innocence trial. If used properly, having two counsel can enable the
defense team to ensure adequate attention is paid to both the guilt-
innocence and penalty phases.
Many lawyers choose to dividepreparation for the two phases of the
trial: while one attorney handles the guilt side, the other is responsible for
conducting voir dire and preparing for the possibility of a capital
sentencing hearing. Allocating the burdens by splitting the'trial into two
equally important mini-trials often helps the defense team ensure that
preparation is proceeding on both guilt-innocence and sentencing.
Once doubled in size, the defense, charged with two sets of
particularized duties, is able to gather crucial information for both phases
I Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 2.1 (1989).
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 3005 (Supp. 1996). The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals has consistently held that the defendant must actively seek this
right, however, or it will be presumed waived. Because the right is
statutory rather than constitutional in nature, neither the court nor the
Government need inform the defendant of this conditional entitlement.
United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976); United States
more effectively. Both attorneys must dive into the client's social and
mental history and aggressively seek the assistance of others in order to
tailor that information to the intricacies of their particular stages of the
defense. Any overlap between the two phases operates as a safety net,
keeping the two attorneys in close communication throughout the
process.
Having two defense attorneys also increases opportunities for
communication with the accused. Developing a rapport with the client is
an essential tool in uncovering mitigation evidence but relationships are
often difficult with the restraints of time and personal chemistry. With
more time and an additional personality, a two-person defense team is
more likely to get to know the client; increased rapport will also aid both
attorneys in their investigation of the facts.
In addition to enabling counsel to cope systematically with an
overwhelming amount of material, breaking up the mass of information
into two logical parts serves two other vital functions: it allows counsel
to proceed more aggressively and think thoroughly, and increases the
credibility and effectiveness of the defense before the jury.
II. Strategy and Coordination of Skills
Perhaps the most overlooked assistance that co-counsel can provide
is professional support and perspective. Although each attorney will be
concentrating on different phases of the case, neither attorney should lose
sight of the case as a whole. The two phases of trial are closely related and
the guilt-innocence and penalty phases must be tightly integrated for a
successful resolution of the case. Co-counsel should consult with each
other on a regular basis to ensure that both lawyers are familiar enough
that they could present the other side of the case if needed. Detailed
communication is especially important when only one of the attorneys
has significant experience in capital litigation. Moreover, while the
experienced attorney can help guide the attorney unfamiliar with capital
defense through the thicket of capital punishment law, the inexperienced
attorney has the advantage of bringing novel perspectives to the case.
To present the most zealous defense for the client, primary counsel
may want to request that the additional counsel come from another
v. Blankenship, 548 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Watson,
496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1973).
3 Failure to appoint two counsel in a capital case upon the
defendant's request presents a strong claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel. If a court refuses to comply with your request for the assignment
of an additional attorney, the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse has
access to motions and memoranda explaining why two defense counsel
are constitutionally required in a capital case.
